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Abstract
This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game the-
ory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice prob-
lem, a condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem—limited
arbitrage—is the same as the condition which is necessary and sufficient to establish
the existence of an equilibrium and the core. The connection is strenghtened by
establishing that a market allocation, which is in the core, can always be realized as
a social allocation, i.e. an allocation which is optimal according to an ordering cho-
sen by a social choice rule. Limited arbitrage characterizes those economies without
Condorcet triples, and those for which Arrow's paradox can be resolved on choices
of large utility values.
1 Introduction
Markets provide a widely used solution to the problem of allocating resources among the
members of the economy. A market equilibrium is individually optimal and clears the
markets. The efficiency of competitive market allocations is what makes them desirable.
A different solution to the resource allocation problem is provided by social choice
rules. These rules derive a social preference as a function of individual preferences in a
fair fashion, for example through voting. An allocation which is optimal among all feasible
allocations according to a social preference, is called a social allocation.
A third solution to the problem of resource allocations is to seek allocations in the
core: these are allocations from which no coalition would want to deviate.
This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, social choice
theory and game theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, a
condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem—limited arbitrage—is
the same as the condition which is necessary and sufficient to establish the existence of an
equilibrium and the core.1 The connection is strengthened by establishing that a market
allocation, which is in the core, can always be realized as a social allocation.
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 These results have been announced and presented in a number of papers starting in 1992: Chichilnisky
[18], [16], [17], [22], [21], [24], [20], [26], [30], [27] Chichilnisky and Heal [31]; these papers and the literature
are discussed in a comment by Monteiro Page and Wooders [50] and its response Chichilnisky [25].
How does limited arbitrage work? Limited arbitrage is a condition on traders' endow-
ments and preferences. Introduced in [18] it bounds potential gains from trade, and the
scope for mutually advantageous reallocation in the economy. In mathematical terms,
limited arbitrage is the non-empty intersection of a family of cones. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, this nonempty intersection is the same as a topological condition: the contractibility
of spaces of preferences. This connection arises from a new result: a family of convex sets
intersects if and only if every subfamily has a contractible union, see [15], [19]. It has been
shown that contractibility is a restriction on the diversity of preferences [43]. Through
its connection with contractibility, therefore, limited arbitrage implies a restriction on the
traders' diversity [22]. Indeed, the central role of limited arbitrage in resource allocation
is explained by its connection with social diversity [22]. Social diversity is crucial for
resource allocation.
For example, social diversity in the form of contractibility of preferences is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of continuous anonymous social choice rules respecting
unanimity, Chichilnisky and Heal [32],[18],[21]. Since limited arbitrage is a form of con-
tractibility, this explains the connection between limited arbitrage and social choice. I
show below that limited arbitrage is also closely connected with Arrow's impossibility the-
orem: it is necessary and sufficient to eliminate Condorcet triples—or cyclical behavior—
on choices over feasible allocations of utility value which approaches the supremum of
utilities, and for solving Arrow's theorem on such choices.2
Diversity has a fundamental role in other forms of resource allocation. Indeed, markets
exist because people are different. Only when traders have different preferences and en-
dowments do they have a reason to trade. Furthermore a condition which limits diversity,
namely limited arbitrage, is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive
equilibrium in general economies [16], [31], [24], [26]. It is also necessary and sufficient
for the uniqueness of equilibrium in strictly regular economies [27]. Elsewhere I showed
also that the diversity of the traders is necessary and sufficient for the existence of Pareto
efficient allocations [28], [29], [16], [24]. Thus a failure of limited arbitrage prevents op-
timal coalition formation: it leads to an empty core [21]. Diversity is therefore equally
important for game theoretical allocations.
These results highlight novel features of resource allocation. For example, market
allocations are generally considered to be practical, more so than social allocations. One
reason for this is that markets are viewed as having equilibria generally, while social choice
theory has always stressed paradoxes and non-existence results. Our results, however,
show that this is not accurate. The same restriction on diversity is necessary for the
existence of market equilibrium and for the existence of appropriate social choice rules.3
A careful examination of the literature illustrates the importance of diversity in re-
source allocation. The social choice literature has focused on interpersonal diversity as a
reason for the non-existence of social choice rules. Several ways of resolving social choice
problems have been proposed by limiting the diversity of the individual preferences, a
'domain restriction' on preferences, Black [8] [9], Pattanaik and Sen [54], and Chichilnisky
and Heal [32]. These works propose ways of limiting the diversity of individuals. The
issue of existence of universal social choice rules—a problem which in its more general
2
 This is an ordinal result, which is independent from the utility representation of preferences. See also
[21], [20], and [22].
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 Competitive equilibria are not always available: when the traders endowments and preferences are
very different the economy can fail to have a competitive equilibrium. Arrow and Hahn ([3], Chapter
4, 1) provided examples of standard market economies with no competitive equilibrium. Their example
highlights the role of interpersonal differences between the traders, differences in their endowments and in
their preferences, in preventing the existence of a competitive equilibrium. The failure of existence arises
when some traders have zero income, while others wish and can afford unboundedly large allocations
which a bounded economy cannot accommodate ([3], Chapter 4, p. 80).
form has no solution—is turned into the question: for what societies can the social choice
problem be resolved? Or: how much diversity can a society function with?4
The issue of diversity has also been studied in the context of market equilibrium. There
are widely used conditions which ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium. These
are also restrictions in social diversity: they require that the endowments of any household
are desired, indirectly or directly, by others, so that their incomes cannot fall to zero:
examples are McKenzie's irreducibility condition [47] [48] [49], and the resource relatedness
condition in Arrow and Hahn [3]. These conditions are different from limited arbitrage,
but nevertheless restrict the diversity of individuals' preferences and endowments. Limited
arbitrage provides another limitation in social diversity: it does so parsimoniously, because
it is a minimal condition, in the sense of being necessary as well as sufficient for existence.
In addition, it applies simultaneously to resource allocation by market equilibrium, by
social choice and the core. Indeed limited arbitrage measures precisely the amount of
diversity acceptable for the functioning of markets, cooperative games and social choice.
There is a different perspective on diversity, one which views diversity as a positive
factor in a group's adaptation to its environment. This view contrasts with the role of
diversity on resource allocation, in which the functioning of economic institutions imposes
limits on diversity. The contrast suggests an open, and perhaps unsettling, question:
Are the forms of diversity implied in our economic institutions consistent with humans'
successful adaptation to change? Are our economic institutions sustainable?
2 Definitions and Examples
An Arrow Debreu market E = {X,Qh,Uh,h = l,...,H} has H > 2 traders, indexed
h = I, ...,H, TV > 2 commodities and consumption or trading space6 X = R± or X — RN;
elsewhere I have considered the case where where instead of RN one has a Hilbert space
of infinite dimension.7 The vector Q^ € i?+ denotes trader h's property rights or initial
endowment and fl = (^2h=l Qh) is the total endowment of the economy; when X = R+ ,
Q » 0.8 Traders may have zero endowments of some goods. Each trader h has a
continuous and convex preference represented by Uh : X —*• R. This paper treats in a
unified way general convex preferences where on every indifference surface for a given
trader, the map g(x) = Du(x)/\\Du(x)\\ assigning to each vector the normalized utility
gradient is either open or closed. Therefore either (i) all indifference surfaces contain no
half lines (the map g is open) or (ii) the normalized gradients to any closed set of indifferent
vectors define a closed set (the map g is closed). Some traders may have preferences of
one type, and some of the other. Case (i) includes strictly convex preferences, and case
(ii) linear preferences. All the assumptions and the results in this paper are ordinal;9
therefore without loss of generality one normalizes utilities so that for all h, Uh(O) — 0
and sup^x:x£XyUh(x) = oo. Preferences are increasing, i.e. x > y => Uh{x) > Uh(y)-
When X = R+ either indifference surfaces of positive utility are contained in the interior
4Black's singlepeakedness condition restricts diversity and solves the problem proposed by Condorcet's
[33] paradox of majority voting.5 Chichilnisky and Heal [32] established domain restrictions which are
necessary and sufficient for the existence of social choice rules which satisfy the axioms of [12], [13]:
contractibility of the space of preferences is necessary and sufficient for the existence of social choice
rules. Although these works deal with somewhat different axioms, they all find the same type of solution:
a restriction of individuals' diversity.
6R% ={(xi,...,xN) e RN :Vt,Xi > 0}.
7Chichilnisky and Heal [30] proved that limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a competitive equilibrium in economies with infinitely many markets.
8If x, y G RN, x > y <=> Vt Xi > yi, x > y <=> x > y and for some i, Xi > yi, and x >> y <=> Vi, x» > yi.
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 Namely independent of the utility representations.
of X. R++, such as Cobb-Douglas utilities, or if an indifference surface of positive utility
intersects a boundary ray,L0 it does so transversally.11
Definition 1 A preference is uniformly non-satiated when it is represented by a utility
Uh with a bounded rate of increase, e.g. for smooth preferences:12 3e,K > 0 : Vx G X,
K > \\Duh(x)\\ >s.
Uniformly non-satiated preferences are rather common: for example, preferences rep-
resented by linear utilities are uniformly non-satiated.13
Proposition 2 If a utility function Uh • RN —*• R is uniformly non-satiated its indiffer-
ence surfaces are within a uniform distance of each other, i.e. Vr, s G R,3N(r,s) G R
such that x G u^l(r) => 3y G ufl1(s) with \\x — y\\ < N(r,s).




Figure 1. This preference is not uniformly nonsatiated because two indifference surfaces
spread apart forever
10
 A boundary ray r in R^ is a set which consists of all the positive multiples of a vector v £
r — {w £ R% : 3A > 0 s.t. w = Xv}
11
 This means that if x £ dR% and u(x) > 0, then Du(x) is not orthogonal to dR% at Ax, VA > 0.
This condition includes strictly convex preferences, Cobb Douglas and CES preferences, many Leontieff
preferences u(x,y) = min(ax,by), preferences which are indifferent to one or more commodities, such as
u(x,y,z) = yjx + y, preferences with indifference surfaces which contain rays of dR^_ such as u(x,y,z) —
x, and preferences defined on a neighnorhood of the positive orthant or the whole space, and which are
increasing along the boundaries, e.g. u(x, y,z) = x -\- y + z.
Smoothness is used to simplify notation only: uniform non satiation requires no smoothness. When
preferences admit no smooth utility representation, then one requires 3e, K > 0: Vx,y,A" || x - y \\>\
u(y) - u(x) j and sup||x||<fi | u(y + x) |> eS.
13This includes Cobb-Douglas, constant elasticity of substitution (CES), preferences with indifference
surfaces of positive consumption contained in the interior of R^, linear preferences, piecewise linear
preferences, most Leontief preferences, preferences with indifference surfaces which intersect the boundary
of the positive orthant (Arrow and Hahn (1971)) and smooth utilities defined on a neighborhood of X
which are transversal to its boundary dX.
Assumption 1. When X = i?v, the preferences in the economy E are
uniformly non-satiated.
The space of feasible a l locat ions is T = {(xi,...,xH) G XH : Yl!h=\xh — ^ } - The
set of supports to individually rational affordable efficient resource allocations
is:
5(E) = {v G RN : if {xx...xH) € T with uh{xh) > uh(nh)Vh = 1,...//,
(v,xh ~Qh) = 0, and uh(zh) > uh(xh) then (v,zh -xh) > 0}. (1)
The set of prices orthogonal to the endowments is14
N = {v G R% - {0} : 3h with (v, Qh) = 0}. (2)
The utility possibility set of the economy E is the set of feasible and individually
rational utility allocations:
U(E) = {(V,,..., VH) : V/i, Vfc = uh{xh) > uh(Qh) > 0,
for some (xi, ...,xH) G T }.
The Pareto frontier of the economy E is the set of feasible, individually rational and
efficient utility allocations:
P(E) = {UG U(E) :~ 3W G U(E) :W»U]
A competitive equilibrium of E consists of a price vector p* G R± and a feasible
allocation (xl...x*H) G T such that x\ optimizes Uh over the budget set Bh(p*) = {x G
2.1 Global and Market Cones
Two cases, X = RN and X — R+, are considered separately.
• Consider first X = RN.
Definition 3 For trader h define the global cone of directions along which utility in-
creases without bound:
Ah(nh) = {xeX:Vy£X,3\>0: uh(Qh 4- Ax) > uh{y)}
This cone contains global information on the economy and is new in the literature.15 In
ordinal terms, the rays of this cone intersect all indifference surfaces corresponding to
bundles preferred by u^ to flh- This cone and the part of its boundary along which utility
never ceases to increase define:
Gh(nh) = {x G X :~ 3 Maxx>ouh(fth 4-
liN is empty when V/i, Qh » 0.
The global cone A(ph,Qh) has points in common with Debreu's [34] "asymptotic cone" corresponding
to the preferred set of ti^ at the initial endowment $7 ,^ in that along any of the rays of A/l(Q/l) utility
increases. Under Assumption 1, its closure A(Qh), equals the "recession" cone used by Rockafeller in 1970,
but not generally: along the rays in A(flfl) utility increases beyond the utility level of any other vector in
the space. This condition need not be satisfied by Debreu's asymptotic cones [34] or by "recession" cones.
For example, for Leontief type preferences the recession cone through the endowment is the closure of the
upper contour, which includes the indifference curve itself. By contrast, the global cone A^(flh) 's t n e
interior of the upper contour set. Related concepts appeared in Chichilnisky [10] [11]; otherwise there is
no precedent in the literature for global cones.
This cone treats all convex preferences in a unified way and under Assumption 1 it has
a simple structure: when preferences have half lines in their indifferences Gh(Qh) equals
Ah(Qh)', when indifferences contain no half lines, then Gh(£lh) is its closure: it is therefore
identical to the global cone defined Chichilnisky 1995, p. 85, (4).16
Definition 4 The market cone of trader h is
Gh{Qh), {z,y) > 0} (3)
Dh is the cone of prices assigning strictly positive value to all directions of net trades
leading to eventually increasing utility. This is a convex cone.
Asymptotes of
indifference curves
Figure 2. This preference has a 'fan' of directions along which the utility values reach a
bound. Assumption 1 is not satisfied. All the directions in the fan are in the recession
cone but none in the global cone G/,, or in the cone Ah-
The following proposition establishes the structure of the global cones, and is used in
proving the connection between limited arbitrage, equilibrium and the core:
Proposition 5 If the function uh : RN —> R is uniformly non-satiated: (i) The interior
of the global cone is
G°h(nh) =
Gh(Clh) : li + Xz) = oo} ^ 0.
(ii) The boundary of the cone Gh(Qh), dGh(Qh), contains (a) those directions along which
utility increases towards a bounded value that is never reached:
Bh{fth) = {z£ dAh{Qh) : VA > 0, uh(Qh + \z) ^ lim
A—>oo
lh + Xz) < oo}
and (b) those directions along which the utility eventually achieves a constant value:
Ch(Qh) = {ze dAh{Qh) :3N:X,n>N=> uh{tth + Xz) =
16The cone G/l(Q/l) is that in Chichilnisky [18] under Assumption 1, and it appears also in Monteiro
Page and Wooders [50] which is a comment on Chichilnisky [18].
(in) the interior of the global cone, its boundary and its closure and the cones G^ and
are uniform across all vectors in the space, i.e. Vfi,A £ X :
c
and in particular
(iv) For general non-satiated preferences Gh{Qh) and Dh{£lh) may not be uniform.
Proof. See [26], Proposition 3, Appendix.
• Consider next the case: X = R±
Definition 6 The market cone of trader h is:
Dt(nh) = Dh(nh)f]S(E) ifS(E) C N, (
= Dh(Qh) otherwise.
where 5(E) and N are defined in (1) and (2).u
There is no analog to Proposition 2 when X = R+; indeed, when X — R+ the market
cones D^(Qh) typically vary with the initial endowments.
Proposition 7 When X = R+ and an indifference surface of Uh corresponding to a
positive consumption bundle x > 0 intersects a boundary ray r C dX, then r £ Gh(0).32
Proof. Recall that we assumed Uh(Q) = 0, and that the preference's indifference sur-
faces of positive utility are either (a) contained in the interior of i?+, .R++, or (b) they
intersect a boundary ray r of R+ and do so transversally. In case (a) the proposition is
satisfied trivially, because no indifference surface of strictly positive value ever intersects
the boundary of R+. In case (b) the proposition follows immediately from the definition
of transversality. Observe that it is possible that swpx<zr{uh(x)) < oo. I
Definition 8 The core of the economy E is the set of allocations which no coalition can
improve upon within its own endowments:
C(E) = {{xu...,xH) € RNxH : ^ 2(xh -nh)=0and~JC {1,..., H) :
h
and 3j £ J : Uj(yj) > UJ{XJ)}.
3 Limited Arbitrage: Definition and Examples
This section provides the definition of limited arbitrage. It gives an intuitive interpretation
for limited arbitrage in terms of gains from trade, and contrasts limited arbitrage with
the arbitrage concept used in financial markets. It provides examples of economies with
and without limited arbitrage.
L7The market cone Dt is the whole consumption set X = RN+ when S(E) has a vector assigning
strictly positive income to all individuals. If some trader has zero income, then this trader must have a
boundary endowment.









Figure 3. Limited arbitrage is satisfied: feasible allocations lead to bounded utility
increases.
U i
Figure 4. Limited arbitrage is not satisfied: there exist a feasible unbounded sequence of
allocations, {W\, W{), (W2, W2),... , along which both traders' utility never ceases to
increase.
3.1 Interpretation of Limited Arbitrage as Bounded Gains From
Trade when X = RN
Gains from trade are defined by:
H
G(E) = sup{V^(u/l(x/l) — Uh(Qh)}, where
h=l
xh - fth) = 0, and Wi, uh(xh) > uh(nh) > 0.
h=l
The Proposition below applies to preferences where the normals to a closed set of
indifferent vectors defines a closed set, case (ii); the Corollary following it applies both to
case (i) and (ii):
Proposition 11 In case (ii), the economy E satisfies limited arbitrage if and only if gains
from trade are bounded i.e. if and only if8
G(E) < oo.
For a proof see Theorem 1 proved in the Appendix of [26]; its sufficiency part is valid
for all preferences satisfying Assumption 1, case (i) or case (ii), so that:
Corollary 12 For all economies with uniformly non-satiated preferences, limited arbi-
trage implies bounded gains from trade.19
3.2 Examples of markets with and without limited arbitrage
Example 13 Figures 3 and 4 above illustrate an economy with two traders trading in
X = B?\ in Figure 3 the market cones intersect and the economy has limited arbitrage.
In Figure 4 the market cones do not intersect and the economy does not have limited
arbitrage. Figure 5 below illustrates three traders trading in X = R3; each two market
cones intersect, but the three market cones do not intersect, and the economy violates
limited arbitrage. This figure illustrates the fact that the union of the market cones may
fail to be contractible: indeed, this failure corresponds to the failure of the market cones
to intersect, as proven in Chichilnisky [19].
18The expression G(E) < oo holds when V/i, sup/a..ie;f i. Ufl(x) = oo; it must be replaced by
G(E) < s u p { x : i £ X H : £ X h = f W ; E h ) > U h ( n h ) } (£ f = 1 uh(xh) - uh(Qh)) - k, for some positive k, when
and sup { a . . x e x } uh(x) < oo.
19
 The simplest illustration of the link between limited arbitrage and no-arbitrage is an economy E where
the traders' initial endowments are zero, Q^ = 0 for h — 1,2, and the set of gradients to indifference
surfaces are closed. Here no-arbitrage at the initial endowments means that there are no trades which
could increase the traders' utilities at zero cost: gains from trade in E are zero. By contrast, E has limited
arbitrage when no trader can increase utility beyond a given bound at zero cost: gains from trade are
bounded.
In brief: no-arbitrage requires that there should be no gains from trade at zero cost while limited
arbitrage requires that there should be only bounded utility arbitrage or limited gains from trade. In
linear economies, limited arbitrage "collapses" into no-arbitrage.
Figure 5. Three traders in R3. Every two traders's subeconomy has limited arbitrage
but the whole economy does not.
Example 14 When the consumption set is X = R+, limited arbitrage is always satisfied
if all indifference surfaces through positive consumption bundles are contained in the inte-
rior of X, R^^. Examples of such preferences are those given by Cobb-Douglas utilities,
or by utilities with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) with elasticity of substitution
a <1. This is because all such preferences have as global cone the positive orthant (or its
closure), and therefore their market cones always intersect. These preferences are very
similar to each other on choices involving large utility levels: this is a form of similarity of
preferences. Economies where the individuals' initial endowments are strictly interior to
the consumption set X always satisfy the limited arbitrage condition in the case X = R+,
since in this case V/i, R++ C D^(Q,h) for all h = 1, ...,H.
Example 15 When X = R+ the limited arbitrage condition may fail to be satisfied when
some trader's endowment vector Q^ is in the boundary of the consumption space. dR+,
and at all supporting prices in S(E) some trader has zero income, i.e. when Vp £ S(E)
3h such that (p,f^) = 0. In this case, S(E) C N. This case is illustrated in Figure 6
below; it is a rather general case which may occur in economies with many individuals
and with many commodities. When all individuals have positive income at some price
p E S(E), then limited arbitrage is always satisfied since by definition in this case V/i,
= R%+ C D+{Qi) for all h = l,...,H.
Figure 6. Limited arbitrage fails. Trader two only owns one good, to which the first
trader is indifferent.
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Example 16 A competitive equilibrium may exist even when some traders have zero in-
come, showing that Arrow's "resource relatedness" condition [3] is sufficient but not nec-
essary for existence of an equilibrium. Figure 7 below illustrates an economy where at all
supporting prices some trader has zero income: Vp € S(E) 3h such that {p,Qh) = 0, i.e.
S(E) C N; in this economy, however, limited arbitrage is satisfied so that a competitive
equilibrium exists. The initial allocation and a price vector assigning value zero to the
second good defines such an equilibrium.
Figure 7. Equilibrium exists even when one trader has zero income
4 Limited Arbitrage and the Compactness of the Pareto
Frontier
The Pareto frontier P(E) is the set of feasible, efficient and individually rational utility
allocations. With H traders it is a subset of R+ . Proving the boundedness and closedness
of the Pareto frontier is a crucial step in establishing the existence of a competitive
equilibrium and the non-emptiness of the core. The main theorem of this section shows
that limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for this.
There is a novel feature of the results which are presented here, a feature which is
shared which those that were previously established in Chichilnisky [18], [20], [30], [26],
and Chichilnisky and Heal [29], [30]. It starts from the observation that the compactness
of the Pareto frontier need not imply the compactness of the set of feasible commodity
allocations. Indeed, such boundedness is not used in this paper, nor was it used in the
results of Chichilnisky [18], [20], [30], [26] and Chichilnisky and Heal [30]: these are the
first results in the literature proving the existence of equilibrium and the non-emptiness of
the core in economies where limited arbitrage holds and the set of feasible and individually
rational allocations is generally unbounded.
Example 17 Figure 8 shows that the Pareto frontier may fail to be closed even in finite
dimensional models, provided the consumption set is the whole Euclidean space. It shows
two traders with indifference curves having the line y = —x as asymptote. Consumption
sets are the whole space and feasible allocations are those which sum to zero. Utility
functions are ux = X{ 4- yi ± e~(Xi~Vi\i = 1,2. Limited arbitrage rules out such cases.
Another example is a two-agent economy where both agents have linear preferences: if
the preferences are different the set of feasible utility allocations is unbounded. Of course,
limited arbitrage rules out such situations.
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Figure 8. The Pareto frontier may fail to be closed even in finite dimensions
Theorem 18 Consider an economy E as defined in Section 1. Then limited arbitrage
is necessary and sufficient for the compactness of the Pareto frontier.
See the Proof of Theorem 1 in the Appendix of [26].
5 Competitive Equilibrium and Limited Arbitrage
This section links the existence of a competitive equilibrium with limited arbitrage. The
result is that limited arbitrage is simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a competitive equilibrium.
The result presented below was established first in Chichilnisky [18], [20], [21], [26], [30]
for preferences which are either all in case (i) e.g. strictly convex, or in case (ii), e.g. they
have indifference surfaces with a closed set of gradient directions. The result presented
here extends these earlier results in that it deals in a unified way with non-satiated convex
preferences: in the same economy there may be a mixture of preferences of type (i) and
(ii).20
The condition of limited arbitrage need not be tested on all traders simultaneously:
in the case of RN, it needs only be satisfied on subeconomies with no more traders than
the number of commodities in the economy, N, plus one.
Definition 19 A k—trader sub-economy of E is an economy F consisting of a subset of
k < H traders in E, each with the endowments and preferences as in E: F = {X, Uh,Vth,h £
J C {1,..., H}, cardinality (J) = k < H}.
Theorem 20 The following four properties of an economy E with trading space RN are
equivalent:
(i) E has a competitive equilibrium
(ii) Every sub economy of E with at most N 4-1 traders has a competitive equilibrium
20The results on equilibrium in this paper originated from a theorem in Chichilnisky and Heal [29] as
paper which was submitted for publication in 1984, nine years before it appeared in print: these dates
are recorded in the printed version [32]. Chichilnisky and Heal [29] [32] provide a no-arbitrage condition
and prove that it is sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the compactness of the
utility set in Arrow Debreu economies with or without short sales, with infinitely or finitely many markets
and with general preferences which are convex or strictly convex. Subsequent to [29] Werner [56] proved
existence results for markets with short sales, relying on a no-arbitrage condition defined from recession
cones. For Hart-type models which are incomplete as they lack futures markets and which do not have the
generality of the Arrow Debreu model, Page [53] uses Werner's no-arbitrage condition to prove existence
of a market equilibrium. The equilibria in Hart-type models are generally inefficient, and their allocations
are not in the Pareto frontier.
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(Hi) E has limited arbitrage
(iv) E has limited arbitrage for any subset of traders with no more that N+1 members.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 2 in the Appendix of [26] for (i)«=>(iii) and (ii)<^(iv).
That (iii)^(iv) follows from Helley's theorem, which is a corollary in Chichilnisky [19]:
Consider a family {£/i}i=i...// of convex sets in RN, H.N > 1. Then
/ 0 if and only if f] Ux ^ 0
1 = 1
for any subset of indices J C {I...H} having at most Ar 4- 1 elements.
In particular, an economy E as defined in Section 2 satisfies limited arbitrage, if and only
if it satisfies limited arbitrage for any subset of k — N + 1 traders, where TV is the number
of commodities in the economy E. I
6 Limited Arbitrage, Equilibrium and The Core
The following is a corollary of Theorem 2:
Theorem 21 Consider an economy E = {X,Uh,flh,h = 1, • - . , #} , where H > 2, X — RN
and N > 1, or X is a Hilbert space H. Then the following four properties are equivalent:
(i) The economy E has limited arbitrage
(ii) The economy E has a core
(Hi) The economy E has a competitive equilibrium
(iv) When X = RN, every subeconomy of E with at most TV4-1 trades has a competitive
equilibrium and a core.
Proof. For a proof of (i)<=>(ii)<=> (iii) see [21], which contains also a discussion of the
literature.21
Finally I establish (iv)<=>(i): this follows directly from the fact that an economy has
limited arbitrage if and only if every subeconomy of at most JV + 1 traders has limited
arbitrage, Theorem 9 in the Appendix. I
7 Limited Arbitrage and Social Choice
Limited arbitrage is also crucial for achieving resource allocation via social choice. Two
main approaches to social choice are studied here. One is Arrow's: his axioms of social
choice require that the social choice rule <£ be non-dictatorial, independent of irrelevant
alternatives, and satisfy a Pareto condition Arrow [2]. A second approach requires, in-
stead, that the rule <1> be continuous, anonymous, and respect unanimity, Chichilnisky
[12], [13]. Both approaches have led to corresponding impossibility results [2], [12], [13].
Though the two sets of axioms are quite different, it has been shown recently that the
impossibility results which emerge from them are equivalent, see Baryshnikov [7]. Fur-
thermore, as is shown below, limited arbitrage is closely connected with both sets of
axioms. Economies which satisfy limited arbitrage admit social choice rules with either
21
 This result was presented at the January 3-5, 1994 Annual Meetings of the Econometric Society in
Boston. Page acted as referee for [24]. Subsequently I received a working paper by Page and Wooders on
a related topic; see Monteiro Page and Wooders [50] which is a comment on Chichilnisky [19], [22] and
[24], and the response in Chichilnisky [26].
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set of axioms. Therefore, in a well defined sense, the social choice problem can only be
solved in those economies which satisfy limited arbitrage.
How do we allocate resources by social choice? Social choice rules assign a social pref-
erence $(UI...UH) to each list {U\...UH) of individual preferences of an economy E.22The
social preference ranks allocations in RN x H, and allows one to select an optimal feasible
allocation. This is the resource allocation obtained via social choice.
The procedure requires, of course, that a social choice rule <£ exists: the role of limited
arbitrage is important because it ensures existence. This will be established below. I
prove here that limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for resolving Arrow's paradox
when the domain of individual preferences are those in the economy, and the choices are
those feasible allocations which give large utility value.23
Limited arbitrage provides a restriction on the relationship between individual prefer-
ences under which social choice rules exist. A brief background on the matter of preference
diversity follows.
Arrow's impossibility theorem established that in general a social choice rule <l> does
not exist: the problem of social choice has no solution unless individual preferences are
restricted. Duncan Black [8] established that the "single peakedness" of preferences is a
sufficient restriction to obtain majority rules. Using different axioms, Chichilnisky [12],
[13] established also that a social choice rule <£ does not generally exist; subsequently
Chichilnisky and Heal [29] established a necessary and sufficient restriction for the reso-
lution of the social choice paradox: the contractibility of the space of preferences. Con-
tractibility can be interpreted as a limitation on preference diversity, Heal [43]. In all
cases, therefore, the problem of social choice is resolved by restricting the diversity of
individual preferences. The main result in this section is that the restriction on individual
preferences required to solve the problem is precisely limited arbitrage. The connection
between limited arbitrage and contractibility is discussed below.
The section is organized as follows. First I show in Proposition 6 that the economy E
satisfies limited arbitrage if and only if it contains no Condorcet cycles on choices of large
utility values. Condorcet cycles are the building blocks of Arrow's impossibility theorem,
and are at the root of the social choice problem. On the basis of Proposition 6, I prove in
Theorem 9 that limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for resolving Arrow's paradox
on allocations of large utility values.
Definition 22 A Condorcet cycle is a collection of three preferences over a choice set
X, represented by three utilities U{ : X —> R, i = 1,2,3, and three choices a, {3, 7 within
a feasible set Y C X such that Ui(a) > u\(fl) > 1*1(7), ^2(7) > ^2(0:) > U2{{3) and
u3(0) > u3(j) > u3(a).
Within an economy with finite resources Q > > 0, the social choice problem is about the
choice between allocations of these resources. Choices are in X = RNxH. An allocation
(xi...xH) £ RNxH is feasible if Yl%xi~ ^ = 0- Consider an economy E as defined in Section
2. Preferences over private consumption are increasing, Uh(x) > Uh(y) if x > y € RN,
utilities are uniformly non-satiated (Assumption 1), and indifference surfaces which are not
bounded below have a closed set of gradients, so that Gh — Ah- While the preferences in
E are defined over private consumption, they naturally define preference over allocations,
as follows: define Uh{x\...XH) > Uh(yi...yH) *=> v>h(xh) > Uh(yh)- Thus the preferences in
the economy E induce naturally preferences over the feasible allocations in E.
22
 In the economy E the traders' preferences are denned over private consumption Uj : RN —> R, but they
define automatically preferences over allocations in R : Ui(x\...xn) > U{(yi...J/H) ^  ui(xi) ^ ui(Vi)-
23The concept of "large utility values" is purely ordinal; it is denned relative to the maximum utility
value achieved by a utility representation.
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Definition 23 The family of preferences {UI...UH}, uh : RN —> R of an economy E has a
Condorcet cycle of size k if for every three preferences uk,U2,uk £ {U\...UH} there exists
three feasible allocations ak = (ak,a^a^) £ X3xH C R3xNxH;(3k = (£f,/?£,/$) and
— (7i:72'73) which define a Condorcet cycle, and such that each trader h = 1,.. . ,// ,
achieves at least a utility level k at each choice:
{[ukh(akh),ukh($hh),uh(7k)}} > k.
The following shows that limited arbitrage eliminates Condorcet cycles on matters of
great importance, namely on those with utility level approaching the supremum of the
utilities, which for simplicity and without loss of generality we have assumed to be oo :
Proposition 24 Let E be a market economy with short sales (X — RN) and H > 3
traders. Then E has social diversity if and only if its traders' preferences have Condorcet
cycles of every size. Equivalently, E has limited arbitrage if and only for some k > 0, the
traders' preferences have no Condorcet cycles of size larger than k.
Proof. Consider an economy with Condorcet cycles of all sizes. For each k > 0, there
exists three allocations denoted (ak,pk,jk) £ R3xNxH and three traders w£ u£2,u£3 C
{U\...UH} which define a Condorcet triple of size k. By definition, for every A;, each of the
three allocations is feasible, for example, ak = (ak,...,a.kH) £ RNxH, and Yli=i(ak) ~ 0-
Furthermore minAs=ii...iJ//{[uJ(aJ), uj|(/?J), uh(<y%)]} > k, so that e.g. l im^oo {uh{akh)) =
oo. There exist therefore a sequence of allocations (0k)k=i,2... = (^,---,^^)fc=i,2...such
that Vfc, Ylh=i^h — ° a n d V / l suPfc-oo(inf*=i,2,3(wfc(0*)) = °°- T h i s implies that E has
unbounded gains from trade, which contradicts Proposition 3. Therefore E cannot have
Condorcet cycles of every size.
Conversely, if E has no limited arbitrage, for any A; > 0, there exist a feasible allocation
(a![,a2,...,akH), such that J2h=i a£ — ^' a n d ^ ' uh(ah) ^ ^- ^ o r e a c n integer A; > 0, and
for a small enough e > 0 define now the vector A = (e,...,e) £ R+ and the following
three allocations: ak = (kak, ka% - 2A, kak + 2A, kak,..., kakH), (3k — (kak —A,ka2,kak +
A, kakt,...,kalff) and ^k = (kak — 2A, ka^ — A, kak + 3A, kak, ..kakH). Each allocation is
feasible, e.g. kak-^-ka^ -2A + ka% + 2A +ka% +... + ka^ = k(^=l aj) < 0. Furthermore
for each k > 0 sufficiently large, the three allocations ak,(3k, -yk and the traders h = 1,2,3,
define a Condorcet cycle of size k : all traders except for 1,2,3, are indifferent between
the three allocations and they reach a utility value at least k, while trader 1 prefers ak to
3k to 7fc, trader 3 prefers j k to ak to f3k, and trader 2 prefers (3k to j k to ak. Observe
that this construction can be made for any three traders within the set {1, 2,..., H}. This
completes the proof. M
The next result uses Proposition 5 to establish the connection between limited ar-
bitrage and Arrow's theorem. Consider Arrow's three axioms: Pareto, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship. The social choice problem is to find a social
choice rule $ : PJ' —• P from individual to social preferences satisfying Arrow's three
axioms; the domain for the rule $ are profiles of individual preferences over allocations
of the economy E: $ : P J —• P. Recall that each preference in the economy E defines a
preference over feasible allocations in E.
Definition 25 The economy E admits a resolution of Arrow's paradox if for any number
of voters j > 3 there exists a social choice function from the space P = {ui ,...,UH} of
preferences of the economy E into the space Q of complete transitive preference defined on
the space of feasible allocations of E, $ : P J —*• Q, satisfying Arrow's three axioms.
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Definition 26 A feasible allocation (af,..., c*^) £ RNxH has utility value k, or simply
value k, if each trader achieves at least a utility level k :
mm{[uk{ak), ...,uH{akH)}} > k.
(H
Definition 27 Arrow's paradox is said to be resolved on choices of large utility value in
the economy E when for all j > 3 there exists social choice function <J> : PJ —• Q and a
k > 0 such that <3> is defined on all profiles of j preferences in E, and it satisfies Arrow's
three axioms when restricted to allocations of utility value exceeding k.
Theorem 28 Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for a resolution of Arrow's
paradox on choices of large utility value in the economy E.
Proof. Necessity follows from Proposition 5, since by Arrow's axiom of independence of
irrelevant alternatives, the existence of one Condorcet triple of size A; suffices to produce
Arrow's impossibility theorem on feasible choices of value k in our domain of preferences,
see Arrow (1951). Sufficiency is immediate: limited arbitrage eliminates feasible allocation
of large utility value by Proposition 4, because it bounds gains from trade. Therefore it
resolves Arrow's paradox, because this is automatically resolved in an empty domain of
choices. •
7.1 Anonymity and respect of unanimity
Consider now the second approach to social choice, Chichilnisky [12], [13] which seeks
continuous anonymous social choice rules which respect unanimity. The link connecting
arbitrage with social choices is still very close but it takes a different form. In this case the
connection is between the contractibility of the space of preferences, which is necessary
and sufficient for the existence of continuous, anonymous rules which respect unanimity
(Chichilnisky and Heal [32]) and limited arbitrage.
Continuity is defined in a standard manner; anonymity means that the social preference
does not depend on the order of voting. Respect of unanimity means that if all individuals
have identical preferences overall, the social preference is this common preference; it is a
very weak version of the Pareto condition. It was shown in Chichilnisky [12] [13] that,
for general spaces of preferences, there exist no social choice rules satisfying these three
axioms. Subsequently Chichilnisky and Heal [32] established that contractibility is exactly
what is needed for the existence of social choice rules.
Formally: consider a general topological space x consisting of preferences over the
space of allocations XK for K > 2 individuals. The preferences in x need not be those of
a market economy. A K-profile of individual preferences is a list of preferences for the K
individuals, i.e. a K—tuple of preferences in the space x> denoted {K\...KK) £ XK• The
social choice problem is defined on any space of preferences x a s the problem of finding
for all K > 2 a map cp '• XK ~* X such that
(Al) (ft is continuous
(A2) <f) is symmetric or anonymous, i.e. 4)(K,\...KK) = ^{^(^...^(KK)) for any permu-
tation 7T of the set {I...K}, and
(.43) 0 respects unanimity, i.e. 4>(K,I...KK) = K if «» = Kj = K for all i, j £ {I...K}.
Axioms {Al), (A2), (A3) were introduced in Chichilnisky [12][13]. A comparison be-
tween these axioms and Arrow's classic axioms of social choice is discussed in Section
13. It was proven in Theorem 1 of Chichilnisky [12] that these three axioms are generally
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inconsistent, in the sense that when \ *s the space of all non-trivial smooth preferences de-
fined on Euclidean choice spaces, there exists no map 0 satisfying these three axioms. The
result is valid whether or not the preferences admit satiation. However, when respect of
unanimity (A3) is replaced by a Pareto condition, the impossibility result of Chichilnisky
[12] holds even when the total indifference between all choices is allowed as the social
preference. 24
It is worth observing that the following result is valid for any topology on the space
of preferences T. In this sense this result is analogous to a fixed point theorem or to
a maximization theorem: whatever the topology, a continuous function from a compact
convex space to itself has a fixed point and a continuous function of a compact set has a
maximum. All these statements, and the one below, apply independently of the topology
chosen.
Theorem 29 Let T be a connected space of preferences endowed with any topology. Then
T admits a continuous anonymous map <£ respecting unanimity
$>:Tk -> T
for every k > 2. if and only if T is contractible.
Proof. See Chichilnisky and Heal [32]. •
The close relation between contractibility and non-empty intersection—which is lim-
ited arbitrage—follows from the following theorem:
Theorem 30 Let {f7l}i=i.../ be a family of convex sets in RN. The family has a non-
empty intersection if and only if every subfamily has a contractible union:
4> o- | J U{ is contractible VJ C {1.../}.
1 = 1
Proof. See Chichilnisky [15], [19]. •
This theorem holds for general excisive families of sets, including acyclic families and
even simple families which consist of sets which need not be convex, acyclic, open or
even connected. This theorem was shown to imply the Knaster Kuratowski Marzukiewicz
theorem and Brouwer's fixed point theorem [19], but it is not implied by them.
7.1.1 Social Allocations
Consider any space x °f preferences over the space of allocations Xr\ there are r > 2
individuals, each with a preference K{ £ x> * = l...r. The preferences in x m aY o r m a v
not be part of a market economy. When a social choice map 4> '• Xr ~* X exists satisfying
the three axioms: continuity (Al), anonymity (A2), and respect of unanimity (A3) it
defines a social allocation for the space of preferences x as follows: For each profile of
individual preferences (ni...Kr) G f a social allocation is a resource allocation in Xr
which is optimal within the set of feasible allocations T according to the social preference
4>{K\...Kr) £ X- Such a resource allocation is located by a social choice rule which satisfies
the three ethical axioms (Al)(A2), (A3).
24The Pareto condition requires that when all preferences in a profile prefer one choice y to another
i,so does the social preference.
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8 Similarity of preferences
We aim to define precisely what is meant by preferences being similar, and to show how-
to define populations of individuals having preferences similar to those in the market
E. The concepts of similarity and diversity will take the preferences and endowments in
the economy £ a s a benchmark. An essential characteristic of the agents is their global
cones. A geometric interpretation of similarity is that a preference a is similar to another
preference p when a increases along those directions which give p unbounded utility gains,
and only along those directions. In particular, a preference o is not similar to another
p if—and only if—there exist a direction along which p can achieve unbounded increases
in utility, yet along the same direction, a's utility decreases. Intuitively the preferences
p and o should not be considered similar in this latter case. We shall therefore consider
a universe of preferences in which individuals' preferred directions are similar to those of
the individuals in the market in the sense that their gradients have positive inner products
with the global cones of some trader in the economy E.
Formally, consider an economy E = {X,£li,pi,i = I...H}. Each preference p\ in E
is defined over i's private consumption set X. However, as we saw in Section 2, pi also
defines a preference over all allocations in Xr for any number of individuals r > 1 : an
allocation (xi...xr) G Xr is preferred by individual i in position j to another (yi...yr) if
and only if px prefers Xj to yj. We may therefore consider pi as a preference defined over
allocations, using for it the same notation when the meaning is clear from the context.
Consider first the case X = RN. Let rj be any concave, smooth preference defined over
allocations in Xr, r > 1. Note that, in general, a preference over allocations may not be
monotonic. We seek to formalize the notion that r\ is similar to the preference of trader i
in the market E if it agrees with the preference pi of i on important choices: the preference
77 must increase in the directions of individual i's global cone. This is formalized in the
following definition of similarity to the preference of trader i.
Let the normal to the indifference surface of the preference 77 at the allocation £ G Xr
be denoted Grj(£); it is an N x r vector indicating the direction of increase of preference
rj at the social allocation £ G Rr • This normal always exists and is unique because we
assumed that the preference 77 is smooth:
Definition 31 When X = RN an individual preference 77 over resource allocations in Xr
is said to be similar to the preference of trader i of the economy E = {X, pi, f^,z = I...H]
in position j when:
where Di(pi, Cti) is the market cone of individual i. This means that the gradient of r\ has
a strictly positive inner product with the vectors of the global cone Ai(pi, fti) of individual
i in position j , as defined in Section 2. Similarly:
Definition 32 When X = R+, a preference rj over resource allocations in Xr is said




8.1 Private and Public Preferences
A preference 77 is private when it is indifferent to the consumption of anyone else, and it is
public otherwise. Therefore a preference px is private when it is defined over individual t's
(private) consumption set X; it is public if defined over allocations, XH. For any number
r > 2 of individuals, a private preference p; defines a public preference: (x\...xr) G Xr
is preferred by individual i in position j G {l---^ *} to (yi...yr) G Xr <=> Xj >zPi yj. When
a preference is private and the individual occupies position j G {l.. .r}, then its normal
Gr](£) G / ? r x A has only N non-zero components, those in position j , indicated Grf(^). A
private preference is therefore similar to that of an individual i in the economy E in one
position j . By contrast, if a preference is not private, it may in principle be similar to those
of different individuals i in different positions j = l...r. The results of this paper apply
equally well when we consider solely private individual preferences, or when individual
preferences are either private or public. When the space of preferences consists solely of
private preferences, the concept of respect of unanimity must be modified slightly.25 We
consider here spaces consisting of preferences which are either private or public.
We may now define similarity of a preference with respect to a set K of traders
in the economy E (as opposed to similarity to the preference of a trader i in position
j G {l ,2 . . . , r} , which was defined in (7) and (6)):
A private preference r\ over resource allocations in Xr is similar to those of a set of
traders K C {I...H} in the market economy E if:
3i G K and 3 j G {l---^ *} s.t.rj is similar to pi in position j , V£ G Xr (8)
When the preference 77 is public, we have:
Vj G {l...r}, 3i G K s.t. r\ is similar to pi in position j , V£ G Xr (9)
The next step is to define spaces of preferences PE which consist of preferences similar
to those of a subset of traders in the market E. The intuitive notion is that of a class
of preferences PE defined over allocations in XH where each preference in PE is similar
to the preference of some trader i within a subset of traders of E. Formally, consider the
space of allocations for r > 2 individuals, Xr, where X = RN o r X = R±. Let j denote
possible positions, j = \...r :
Definition 33 A space of preferences PE over allocations Xr is said to contain preferences
similar to those preferences of a set of traders K C {I...H} in the market economy
E = {X,pr,nt,i = I..H}, for X = RN or X=Rj[ when
T) £ PE <£• T] is a preference similar to those of the set of traders K. (10)
The space of preferences PE consists therefore of either private or public preferences over
allocations in X r; in either case, its preferences are similar to those of the subset K of
traders in the market economy E. Note that the preferences in a space PE need not be
increasing even when all the preferences in the market are increasing. Similarity only
requires that the gradients of preferences in PE be in the dual cones of some preference
in the set of traders K, and the dual cones of increasing preferences may contain vectors
which are not positive.
The following preparatory lemma describes the geometrical structure of spaces of pref-
erences PE which are similar to those in a set K of traders of the economy E.
25
 Respect of unanimity then means that if all individuals have the same gradient over all possible
private choices, then the social preference's gradient over allocations has the same gradient as the traders
in each position, for all possible allocations.
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Lemma 34 Consider a market economy E — {X, pi,Cli,i — 1..H}, where X = RN or
X = R+. Let PE be a space of preferences over allocations for r individuals Xr which
are similar to those of a set K C {I...H} of traders in E. Then when X = RN at each
allocation £ £ Xr and for each position j = l...r, the normals to the indifference surfaces
of all preferences in PE define the set
*
K(PE) = { | J D{Pi,ni)} U {0} = NK U {0} C RN. (11)
Furthermore, when every two-trader sub economy of E satisfies limited arbitrage, then
VA' C {I...H} the set Nx is connected. The set Nx is contractible VA' C {I...H} if and
only if the market economy E satisfies limited arbitrage. When X = R+ all the above




Proof. Since PE consists of preferences over allocations in Xr which are similar to those
of the subset K of traders in the economy E, and these preferences may be private or
public, then by definition (10) (8) (9) (6), at each ( G l r the gradients in the set NK{PE)
define the set
{\jD(PlMr)}\J{0}cRN.
The next step is to establish that the set Nx is connected. The condition of limited
arbitrage for any subset of two traders in the statement of this Lemma, is that is that for
any twro traders l,j in E
This implies that the set
is connected.
Finally we study the contractibility of the set Nx- Theorem 9 in the Appendix estab-
lishes that if {Cj}j=i...j is a family of convex sets and L C J then
UjeL Cj is contractible V L c i
, ,
Since the dual cone Wj D(pj, Qj) is a convex set, the second statement in (12) is equivalent
to the condition that E has limited arbitrage. The first statement, in turn, states that
the set Nx is contractible. Therefore Theorem 9 in the Appendix implies that limited
arbitrage is satisfied if and only if VA' C {I...H}, the set Nx is contractible. H
The following result links the resolution of the social allocation problem with the
resolution of the market allocation problem. A minimal restriction, that every two traders
have limited arbitrage, is now imposed in the market economy E to eliminate somewhat
pathological economies where no two traders can reach a competitive equilibrium, or those
economies where the spaces of preferences similar to those of the traders are discrete or
very disconnected:
Assumption (Cl): every two-trader sub economy of E has limited arbitrage.
Note that condition (Cl) is not necessary for the equivalence of limited arbitrage and
the existence of a competitive equilibrium. The role of this condition is to ensure that the
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set of gradients NK is connected: this was shown in Lemma 2. Note that (Cl) is rather
mild: it certainly does not imply that N^ is contractible, nor that the economy E satisfies
limited arbitrage, nor that E has a competitive equilibrium. For example, Figure 5 above
illustrates an economy where every two dual cones intersect and thus (Cl) is satisfied,
but the economy of Figure 5 does not satisfy limited arbitrage, and it does not have a
competitive equilibrium.
It seems useful to explain intuitively the role of the limited arbitrage condition in
the existence of social choice rules. A condition which is necessary and sufficient for the
existence of social choice rules is that the space of preferences should be contractible,
Chichilnisky and Heal [32]. Therefore to show the existence of social choice rules on pref-
erences similar to those of the market E we must show that the space of such preferences
is contractible. This we do using the condition of limited arbitrage and Theorem 9 in the
Appendix.
Limited arbitrage is the non-empty intersection of market cones. However, Theorem
9 proves that the dual cones intersect if and only if their union is contractible. And, by
Lemma 1, the union of the market cones is precisely the space where the gradients of the
preferences similar to those of the market "live". In other words: the proof that limited
arbitrage is necessary for the existence of a social choice rule derives from the results of
Lemma 1 above, from Theorem 1 of Chichilnisky and Heal [32], and from Theorem 9 in the
Appendix. It may be worth mentioning that preferences which are similar to those in the
market E are not necessarily increasing. Furthermore, a space of preferences consisting
exclusively of increasing preferences may not admit social choice rules because the union
of the market cones may have "holes" and therefore may fail to be contractible.
8.1.1 Contractibility and Similarity
Consider a space PE of preferences which are similar to those of the traders in E. From
Chichilnisky and Heal [32] we know that a social choice rule on this space of preferences
exists if and only if the space of preferences PE is contractible, as defined in Section
2. This condition of contractibility simply means that there exists a continuous way of
deforming the preferences through the space PE, SO that at the end of this process we have
complete unanimity. With contractibility of the space x w e a r e assured of the existence of
a social choice map, and therefore we are assured of a resolution to our resource allocation
problem.
But contractibility is a restriction on social diversity, no more and no less. It tests
whether there is a way of deforming continuously our space of individual preferences into
itself so that at the end of this deformation all the individuals have identical preferences.
A discussion of the role of contractibility in limiting social diversity and in public decision
making is in Heal [43]. Thus we are back at the source of the problem of resource allocation
in markets: individual diversity. As before, we shall focus on the degree of diversity which
allows a solution to the resource allocation problem to exist, this time, at the social choice
level.
9 Social Allocations in a Market
We now specialize the social choice problem to a market economy E = {X,pi,Qi,i —
I..H}. Let PE be a space of preferences over resource allocations in Xr, r > 2, consisting
of preferences which are similar to those of K traders in the economy E as defined in
(10). A social choice map <p assigns to each profile of r individual preferences in Xr
another preference in PE, the social preference over allocations, <fi(Ki...Kr) = 6. Each Kj
is a preference similar to the preference of an individual i in E and so is 9 = 4>(Ki...Kr).
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9.1 Example: A Classical Social Welfare Function
Each individual i = I...H has a utility function U{ : X —• R, where X = RN or X = / ^ .




Note that the gradient of the function W : RNxH —>• i? at an allocation (xi...x#) is a
vector in RNxH, while each individual utility u, has a gradient in RH at the vector xx.
In particular, the gradient of the function W is not the sum or any convex combination
of the gradients of the individuals i = I...H.
The construction of the social welfare function W of (13) is cardinal, in the sense
that it is defined over profiles of individual utilities, and yields a social utility function
W(X\...XH)- However, the social welfare function of (13) can be used to define a social
choice map in ordinal terms, namely a map from profiles of individual preferences to
social preferences. Consider a profile of private preferences (/^...At//), where KX is a private
preference over allocations in XH. Then Vi K,X is induced by a utility function over private
consumption ux(K,i) : X —• R. We may now define the social preference over allocations
in XH corresponding to the profile of preferences (K,\...KH), the preference 0(/ti...«//), as
follows. The normal of 0(KI...AC//) at an allocation £ ={X\...XH) E XH is defined as the
vector
where GjW is the normalized gradient of W{X\...XH) with respect to Xj, i.e.
and Vj, Xj E R+. The role of the real numbers Xj in (14) is to normalize the right hand
side of the expression (14) so that it defines a vector of length one as it corresponds to
the normal of a smooth preference defined in Section 2 (Debreu [34]). Expressions (13)
and (14) define a map from profiles of private preferences over allocations in XH, into
preferences over allocations in XH:
(KI...KH)-+9{KI...KH) (15)
Clearly, the definition in (15) is the ordinal version of the cardinal construction in (13).
The interest of the social welfare function 0 defined in (15) is that it provides an
example of the type of structure for social choice with which we work in this paper. The
similarities are: 0 is defined over profiles of private preferences over allocations, and it
assigns to such a profile another preference over allocations which is typically a public
preference. If the preferences in the profile (KI...KH) are those of a market economy
E = {X,Ki,Qi,i = I...H}, then the social preference assigned to this profile 0(/Ci.../c#)
is similar to those of the traders in E as defined in (10) above. Furthermore, the map 0
is continuous on its arguments and it respects unanimity. Therefore the map 0 satisfies
many of the properties required of our social choice functions.
The differences with our framework are as follows: firstly, 0 is defined solely on private
preferences, while we allow social choice maps which are more general, defined over both
private and public preferences over allocations. Secondly, the map 0 , by its construction,
is not anonymous. Indeed, the map 0 assigns individual i a dictatorial power over the
ith position in the allocation.
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9.2 Example: The Convex Addition of Gradients
As pointed out in 5.1, the gradient of the classical welfare function W defined in (13),
(14) is neither the sum nor the convex combination of the individual utilities' gradients.
A natural question is whether a construction based on the sum or a convex combination
of the individual utilities "s gradients could yield an adequate social preference. Such
construction would have the advantage that it is defined generally, without reference to
additional conditions such as limited arbitrage. The following example shows that such a
construction, although appearing to be natural, typically does not work. Indeed we argue
below that it only works properly when the limited arbitrage condition is satisfied.
Consider for example an economy with two agents each with a linear utility defined
on the consumption set X = R2. The two utilities are different. The global cones A±,A2
of the two linear preferences are two different half spaces, and the corresponding market
cones D\, D2 are the two gradient vectors indicated in Figure 9.
Figure 9
Since the two vectors are different, the market cones do not intersect, and limited
arbitrage is violated. Now consider the linear preference p over allocations in R? x R?
with gradient (Ds,Ds), where D3 is a convex combination of D\ and D2 as shown in
Figure 10, D3 = XDi + (1 - X)D2, 0 < A < 1.
Figure 10
A problem arises in that although the initial endowment allocation ( f i i , ^ ) is strictly
preferred by both individuals to the allocation denoted (^1,^2) in Figure 10, the social
preference p strictly prefers (^1,^2) to (^1,^2) instead.
This property of p contradicts the standard Pareto condition which requires that when
everyone strictly prefers a given allocation to another, so should the social preference. The
reason for this contradiction is that the two dual cones do not intersect. When the dual
cones intersect, then a vector in this intersection defines the gradient of a linear preference
which respects the Pareto condition: this follows directly from the definition of dual cones.
Otherwise, no preference exists respecting the Pareto condition.
Another way of looking at the same problem is that the social preference defined by
the addition of the two gradients is not similar to the preferences with gradients D\ and
D2, as defined in Section 9. Therefore the addition of gradients cannot define a map from
profiles of similar preferences into similar preferences as required. This example shows
that the convex sum of gradients cannot be used generally as a way of defining appropriate
social choice rules: the preference with gradients D3 = XD\ 4- (1 — A)Z?2) 0 < A < 1, is
not an adequate social preference for the profile (D\, D2).
The only possibility of respecting the similarity of preferences or the Pareto condition,
would be to assign the social preference with gradient equal to either D\ or to D2 to the
profile (D\, D2). This would respect the similarly condition, and would define a continuous,
anonymous social choice map respecting unanimity on the space of preferences PE =
{Di, D2}. But this is possible only because the space PE is a discrete case consisting only
of two elements, the two linear preferences. In the general case in which the space PE is
connected, a continuous anonymous social choice rule satisfying unanimity exists if and
only if PE is contractible, as proved in Chichilnisky and Heal [32]. And, as shown in
the Appendix Theorem 9 and Corollary 2, limited arbitrage is actually equivalent to the
contractibility of the spaces of preferences.
Our next step is to extend and refine the classical welfare function W defined in (13).
The welfare function W is a cardinal construct, while we wish to provide an ordinal one:






preferences which are similar to those of a market economy E. We seek an anonymous
social choice map, a requirement that neither W in (13) nor its ordinal counterpart 0
in (15), satisfy. Theorem 7 in Section 11 establishes that this task can be accomplished
when the preferences in the market economy E satisfy limited arbitrage, and therefore
by Theorem 9 and Corollary 2 of the Appendix, when the market E has a competitive
equilibrium, and only then.
Assume now that a social choice map 0 with the desired properties (^4l)(/12)(A3)
exists. The existence of a social choice map 0 solves the resource allocation problem from
the point of view of social choice:
We say that the social allocation problem is resolved for preferences similar to those
of the market E = {X,pi,Cll,i = I..H] when for any space of preferences PE
over allocations in Xr similar to a set of traders K C {1...H} in E there exists a
continuous anonymous social choice map 0 : (PEY —* PE respecting unanimity.
Consider a market economy E = {X,pi,Qi,i = I..H} having a social choice map
0 : {PE)H —> PE satisfying the axioms (Al)(A2)(A3) on the space of preferences PE
similar to those of the economy E.
A social allocation for E is a feasible allocation of E which is optimal in the space of
feasible allocations T = {X\...XH : ^Xi = 0} according to the social preference
10 Comparing the two resource allocations problems
10.1 Existence of market allocations
As seen in Section 3 above, even when all individual preferences are smooth, concave and
increasing, and when the consumption sets are positive orthants, not all Arrow-Debreu
exchange economies have a competitive equilibrium. The problem is quite general and it
occurs in economies with any number of individuals and of goods.26 Limited arbitrage
limits precisely the degree of diversity among the agents of the economy to one at which
market equilibrium will exist. Indeed, for economies with consumption bounded below,
X = R+, such limits on diversity are implicit in Arrow's resource relatedness [3] and
in McKenzie's irreducibility condition [47] [48] [49]. All these conditions ensure that the
endowments of any household are desired, directly or indirectly, by others, so that their
incomes cannot fall to zero. In this case our limited arbitrage condition is always satisfied.
Yet zero income by itself does not rule out the existence of a competitive equilibrium;
there may be economies with a competitive equilibrium in which some consumers have
zero income. Figure 7 above illustrates. Furthermore an allocation where some individuals
have zero income reflects a real problem: the fact that some individuals are considered
26
 Other concepts of market equilibrium could be utilized to define a market allocation, such as for
example the qua si-equilibrium or pseudoequilibrium introduced by Debreu [37], or as denned in Arrow
and Hahn [3]. These are closely related definitions; they define allocations where individuals minimize
cost rather than maximizing utility. When individuals' incomes are strictly positive, these concepts agree
with the competitive market equilibrium (Arrow and Hahn [3], Chapter 4) but as Arrow and Hahn point
out, the condition that all individuals should have strictly positive endowments of all goods is unrealistic
([3], Chapter 4, p. 80. Quasi-equilibrium allocations have the advantage that they always exist with
continuous concave preferences and with positive orthants as consumption sets. However, the competitive
equilibrium stands alone in terms of its welfare properties: quasi-equilibrium equilibrium allocations are
not generally Pareto efficient. Therefore the main justification for using market allocations, which is
efficiency, is lost. For this reason we concentrate here on competitive equilibrium allocations. For a study
of limited arbitrage and quasiequilibrium, see Chichilnisky [26].
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worthless, that they have nothing to offer that others want. Our condition of limited
arbitrage brings out the issue of diversity by focusing on the problem of zero income
individuals. It does not attempt to rule out the case of individuals with zero income;
instead, it seeks to determine if society's evaluation of their worthlessness is widely shared.
10.2 Existence of Social Allocations
Within the same type of market economy studied above E — {X, Ql,pl,i = I...H], the
social allocation problem can be defined as follows. Find a social choice rule <p satisfying
the required axioms (Al)(.42)(A3) : 0 must be defined on a space of preferences which
contains those of the market E and is otherwise large enough to satisfy Kant's universality
criterion. The problem has generally no solution because a social choice rule satisfying the
required axioms may not exist, Chichilnisky [12]. Therefore a social contract promising
a solution which satisfies the ethical principles agreed and having a completely universal
domain of preferences, may not deliver. Again, conditions are needed. Here, as in the case
of the market equilibrium, the conditions should be on the exogenous data which identify
the economy E. namely on the individuals' endowments Cli and their preferences p{.
We know that the space of all smooth preferences over allocations in XH is too large:
the three axioms of continuity, anonymity and respect of unanimity are inconsistent in
that case and no social choice rule satisfying them exists, Chichilnisky [12]. We must
therefore search for a universe of preferences and endowments in which a social choice
rule <t> does exist. Such a universe must contain the preferences of our economy E, and we
shall require that it should consist of individuals who share the essential characteristics of
the economy E. The motivation is to compare the types of restrictions needed for existence
of a competitive equilibrium with those required for the existence of a social choice map.
11 Linking Markets, Arbitrage and Social Choice
This section provides the main results linking the two forms of resource allocation: by
markets and by social choices.
Theorem 35 Consider an economy E = {X,pi,Qi,i = 1...H}, H > 2, X = RN or
X = R",N > 1 satisfying (Cl).
The following properties are equivalent
(a) The market economy E has a competitive equilibrium
(b) Every sub economy of E with at most N 4- 1 traders has a competitive equilibrium
(c) E has limited arbitrage
(d) E has limited arbitrage for any subset of individuals with no more than N + 1
members.
(e) For any space of preferences Pg similar to those of a subset K of market traders,
there exists a continuous anonymous social choice map </> : (PEY —*• PE respecting una-
nimity, for all r <N + 1, and
(f) The economy E has a nonempty core.
Proof. The proof that (a)«=>(c) is in [26]. Next I establish the equivalence between (a)
and (e).
Case 1: the consumption set X = RN. We first show that limited arbitrage is a
necessary condition for the existence of the social choice map <f> for all K C {I...H} and
all k > 2 satisfying the three axioms (Al)(A2)(A3).
Assume that such a social choice map 0 exists for all r > 2. Let LPE be the subspace
of PE consisting of all its linear preferences, i.e. those preferences within the space PE
25
which are representable by linear utility functions having their gradients, in each position
j = l...r. contained in the set NK U {0} C RN. Let in : LPE —> PE denote the inclusion
map. Note that each preference v £ LPE is uniquely identified by the normal Nv £ RNr
to one of its indifference surfaces: by linearity all such normals are the same. Therefore
LPE~(NKU{0}Y, (16)
i.e. the space of linear preferences LPE is homeomorphic to the product space (
Now consider an allocation £e XK and define the map vr : PE -^ LPE SO that
where AC£ E LPE is the linear preference over allocations in Xr having as its gradient in
RNr the vector GK(^) which is the normal to the indifference surface of the preference K,
at £. Both maps in and TT are continuous in their domains.
By assumption, there exists a social choice map <p : {PEY —* PE f°r any r > 2, satis-
fying the three axioms. Now consider for any r > 2 the map induced by the composition
of in and 0, defined by:
-> LPE,
The map ip : (LPEY —> LPE, is continuous, anonymous and respects unanimity by
construction, because (p satisfies these three properties. Since by (16) Vj, LPE ~ (NK U
{0})r, i) defines a map A : \{NK U {0})r]r -». (7VK U {0})r for all r > 2 satisfying the
three axioms (Al)(A2)(A3). Since A is continuous and respects unanimity, it maps each
connected component of the space (NK U {0})r into itself. In particular, the restriction
of the map A to the connected component [(NKY]r of [(NK U {0})r]r, denoted A/(iVK) r,
maps [(iVK)r]r into (NKY, i.e. A/(7VK)r : [(iV^)r]r ^(NKY', and it satisfies the three
axioms (Al)(A2)(A3). By Theorem 1 of Chichilnisky and Heal [32] such a map A exists
if and only if the space (NKY is contractible for all r > 2; this in turn is true if and only
if the space NK is contractible - see Section 2. Therefore the contractibility of the space
NK is necessary for the existence of the social choice map <fi. But Theorem 9 proves that
NK is contractible for all K C {I...H} if and only if the limited arbitrage condition is
satisfied. This completes the proof of necessity of limited arbitrage.
We now turn to the proof of sufficiency of limited arbitrage. By definition, limited
arbitrage implies the existence of a non-zero vector v € RN in the intersection of all the
market cones:
Furthermore, by definition of the space PE) all the indifference surfaces of any preference
in PE must intersect the ray defined by the vector (v...v) in the space of allocations XNr.
Therefore the conditions required in Chichilnisky [11] fthe existence of a social choice map
(p : (PEY ~> PE satisfying the three axioms (^41)(^42)(A3) are satisfied for the space PE-
This completes the proof of sufficiency of limited arbitrage.
Case 2. Here X — R+. The proof in this case is the same replacing the set of gradients
NK by the set
K
Finally, the proof that (a)«=>(b) and (b)<=>(d) follows directly from Theorem 9 the
Appendix. That (c)<=>(d) follows from [26] and Theorem 9 in the Appendix. The proof
that (c)«=>(e) follows from Theorem 3. •
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Theorem 36 Consider a market economy E = {X,pi,ttx,i = I...H}. Any market allo-
cation (x\...x*H) G Int(XH) of E is also a social allocation for E.
Proof. When a market allocation for E exists, E has a competitive equilibrium described
by a price vector p* and an allocation (xl...x*H) G XH which is individually optimal
within the budget sets and which clears all the markets. We shall show that if this market
allocation (x\...x*H) is interior to XH, then it is also a social allocation. This means that
any space of preferences PE defined over allocations for the H traders, namely on XH.
and consisting of preferences which are similar to those of the H traders in the economy
E = {X,pi,Cli,i = I...H}, admits a social choice map ^ : (PE)H —* PE satisfying the
axioms (Al)(A2)(A3), and such that (x\...x*H) optimizes the social preference ^(p\...pn)
over the set of all feasible allocations T of the economy E.
Since a market equilibrium exists, by Theorem 7 there exists a social choice map 0 :
(PE)H —»• PE satisfying the three axioms (Al)(^42) and (A3), for the space of preferences
PE similar to the H traders in the economy E. By Theorem 3 we also know that limited
arbitrage is satisfied, i.e. P)i=i D(Pii^-i) ^ 0, since by assumption E has a competitive
equilibrium.
We now use a partition of unity on the space PE as defined in Section 2 in order to
define a modification of the social choice map 0, called ^ , which also satisfies the three
axioms, and according to which the equilibrium allocation is optimal within all feasible
allocations for the social preference ^(p\...pn)- Note that by the results of Chichilnisky
[11] the space PE is contained in a manifold which is the inverse image under a smooth
retraction of a linear space, the space spanned by the vector (v...v) G RNxH, where
v G C\i=iD(pi,rii). Therefore the space PE is Hausdorff and we can therefore apply a
partition of unity, see the Appendix.
Let U be the set of preference profiles in PE consisting of the profile (pi...pu) and of
all its permutations,
U = lj7r{(p7ri...p7rH)}, for all permutations IT of the set {I...H}}.
rr
The set U consists of finitely many points in (PE) ; U is disjoint from the diagonal
&(PE)H = {(«!...«#) G (PE)H : Vi, j Ki = Ac,}, because the profiles in U consist of
private preferences each defined over a different position. Since (PE)H is contained in a
manifold, it is a Hausdorff space.
We shall now construct a new social choice map ^ with the desired properties by
using a partition of unity for (PE) , as defined in Section 2. Using this partition of
unity we modify the map 0 : (PE)H —* PE to obtain another continuous anonymous map
V • (PE) —> PE, which differs from 0 only in an open neighborhood 0(U) of the set U,
and is otherwise identical to 0. Within the set U the new map /if satisfies:
*(PI-PH) = ^(p^-P^) = *p- (17)
for all permutations TT of the set of indices {I...H}, where in (17) /cp* is the linear preference
over allocations in XH with gradient vector (X\DU\(X\)...XHDUH(X*H)), for some vector
(\\..-\H) ^ ^ + , Dui(x\) is the gradient of m at (x*) for a utility Ui which represents pi,
and where
if (KI...KH) £ 9(U). The map
* : (PE)H - PE
satisfies the three axioms by construction. We shall now show that the competitive equi-
librium allocation (x[...x*H) G XH is a social allocation for the economy E with the social
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choice map <£. Since the allocation (x{...x*H) £ Int(XH) by the assumptions of the The-
orem and is the equilibrium allocation corresponding to the price vector p*, there exists
a vector (AJ...AJ^) G R%, such that:
W(x\...x*H) = Mox ( x i . . . l H ) e T ^ ( x x . . . ^ ) (18)
where W(XI...XH) =
1=1
and where the utility ut : A' —• R represents the preference p{. Now choose the vector
1A1...A//) in the definition of fy following (17)to be the vector (\{...\*H) in (18). Then,
with this definition of (Ai...A#), the allocation (x\...x*H) maximizes the social preference
ty{p\...pH) over the feasible set T. The allocation (x\...x*H) € XH is therefore a social
allocation for the social choice map ^ and the economy E, as we wished to prove. I
12 Social Diversity and a Topological Invariant for
Markets
TJ
As defined above, the economy is socially diverse when P|/i=i Dh = </>, see also Chichilnisky
[26]. Diversity admits different "shades", which can be measured by the smallest number
of market cones which do not intersect. I showed in [26] that the resource allocation
properties of the economy E can be described simply in terms of a topological invariant,
which is given by a family of cohomology rings denoted CH(E).
13 Related Literature
13.1 Comparison with Arrow's axioms
It seems worth comparing our axioms with Arrow's [2] classic axioms of social choice.
Arrow's axioms are more suitable for finite set of choices, such as voting among a finite
set of n candidates. Instead, we are choosing here among an infinite set of choices, namely
among the set T of all feasible allocations in Euclidean space.
The three axioms (Al)(A2)(AS) are different, indeed not comparable, to Arrow's [2].
The anonymity condition (A2) is stronger than Arrow's non-dictatorship axiom, because
the former requires equal treatment while the latter eliminates only extreme inequality of
treatment. Respect of unanimity (A3) is strictly weaker than his Pareto condition, since
respect of unanimity is only binding when all preferences within a profile are identical.
Instead, the Pareto condition applies to any profile of preferences which, equal or not,
prefer a given choice x to another y. Finally, Arrow does not consider continuity (Al) as
we do, and we do not require Arrow's axiom of independence from irrelevant alternatives,
an axiom which has been somewhat controversial. In other words: neither set of axioms
implies the other.
Continuity is required here on the grounds of statistical tractability: it implies that
the sampling of populations' preferences will approach the true distribution provided
the grid of observations in the sample is fine enough. The continuity axiom makes this
formulation of social choice better suited to continuous sets of choices and to connected
sets of preferences. This is because when the space of preferences is discrete or finite—as
it would be when there are finitely many choices—then the space of preferences is itself
finite and therefore continuity is a vacuous requirement. Recent work by Baigent [5] [6]
and by Nitzan [52] has extended the axiom (Al) of continuity to one of "proximity"
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of preferences, a concept which is appropriate for discrete spaces of preferences and for
preferences over finitely many choices. Using "proximity" instead of "continuity", and
preserving the other two axioms—anonymity and respect of unanimity—Baigent [5] [6]
proved the impossibility results of Chichilnisky [12] for the case of finitely many choices.
Chichilnisky [14] has recently shown the connection between the existence of social choice
rules and the manipulation of non cooperative games.
What makes the axioms used in this paper particularly well suited for our problem
is that they lend themselves naturally to the study of preferences and choices similar
to those which are studied in market economics. Furthermore, with these axioms there
exist simple necessary and sufficient conditions for resolving the social choice paradox.
Chichilnisky and Heal [32]; this is not true for Arrow's axioms.
Recent results by Y. Baryshnikov [7] highlight a topological connexion between Arrow's
impossibility theorem and my own. This is a somewhat surprising result: using algebraic
topology, it shows that the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives can be used
to prove that the 'nerve' of a family of sets naturally associated with all preferences over a
finite set of choices, has the topological structure of a sphere. Therefore the non-existence
theorem in [12], which applies to spheres, implies Arrow's imposssibility theorem in this
context.
14 Conclusions
On the basis of previous results [18], [21], [22], and [23], I established that limited arbitrage
is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of social choice maps on spaces of
preferences similar to those of a market economy. The same condition—limited arbitrage—
is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core in a
market economy [16], [31], [24], [26], [21]. Furthermore, I showed that a market allocation
is always a social allocation. In this sense, the results of this paper unify three forms of
resource allocation—by markets, games and by social choice—which have developed and
remained separate until now.
I have chosen competitive equilibrium allocations—rather than other concepts of mar-
ket equilibrium—because of the Pareto efficiency of competitive equilibrium. This prop-
erty is generally lost in weaker forms of market equilibrium, such as quasi-equilibrium and
compensated equilibrium. I considered economies with or without bounds on short sales.
I have concentrated on three axioms of social choice: continuity, anonymity and respect
of unanimity, introduced in [12], which are particularly well suited for problems where the
choices are elements in Euclidean space, and for which necessary and sufficient conditions
exist for resolving the social choice problem [32]. Arrow's [2] classic axioms appear to be
better suited for problems with finitely many choices. As already pointed out, however, it
is possible to draw a close topological link between Arrow's theorem and the impossibility
theorem in [12]. The choice of axioms in the latter has led to necessary and sufficient
"domain" restrictions for a resolution of the social choice paradox, proven in Chichilnisky
and Heal [32]. In addition, the condition of limited arbitrage characterizes those economies
where the traders do not have Condorcet triples (i.e. cyclical behavior) of every utility
value, and those where Arrow's impossibility theorem can be resolved.
The crucial condition in all this is the contractibility of the space of preferences,
which is a measure of social diversity [43]. Limited arbitrage is closely connected with
contractibility. A key element in the results is the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the non-empty intersection of a family of sets in Theorem 5, Chichilnisky [15],[19]:
these require the contractibility of the union of all subfamilies of these sets. Limited
arbitrage is defined as the non-empty intersection of the market cones of the traders,
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which we now know to be equivalent to a contractibility condition. Thus I have linked
limited arbitrage, which is needed for the existence of a market equilibrium and the core,
with the contractibility of the space of preferences, which is needed for a resolution of the
social choice problem. The same restriction on social diversity is therefore necessary and
sufficient for the successful resolution of all three problems of resource allocation.
15 Appendix
0. Partitions of Unity. Assume that Y is a Hausdorff space [46]. If U, V are two open
neighborhoods of x £ Y, U C V, U ^ V, a continuous map v : Y —> R is called a partition
of unity for Y", U, V, if: Vy £ Y - V, v(y) = 0, \/y £ U, v(y) = 1, and \/y £ Y, 1 > v(y) > 0.
Such partitions of unity always exist in Hausdorff spaces, [46]. A partition of unity is
used to construct new maps from old ones, having specific values. For any / : Y —> Z
any y £ Y, z £ Z, and any open neighborhood U of y £ Y, there exists a continuous map
g : Y —• Z such that g{y) = z and g(x) = f{x) Wx E X — U. If the map / is symmetric, g
can be constructed to be symmetric also.
1. Intersection and contractibility
Theorem 37 Consider a family {f7t}l==i...n °f convex sets in Rm n,m> 1. Then
n
P | Ui ^ 0 if and only if p | Ut ^  0
for any subset of indices J C {l...n} having at most m + 1 elements. For a proof see
Chichilnisky [19].
Corollary 38 A market economy E as defined in Section 2 with n traders and m com-
modities satisfies limited arbitrage if and only if every sub economy of E with at most
m + 1 traders satisfies limited arbitrage.
For a proof see Chichilnisky [19].
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